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Strategic ofﬂoading of delayed intentions into the external
environment
Sam J. Gilbert
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
In everyday life, we often use external artefacts such as diaries to help us remember intended behaviours.
In addition, we commonly manipulate our environment, for example by placing reminders in noticeable
places. Yet strategic ofﬂoading of intentions to the external environment is not typically permitted in
laboratory tasks examining memory for delayed intentions. What factors inﬂuence our use of such strat-
egies, and what behavioural consequences do they have? This article describes four online experiments
(N= 1196) examining a novel web-based task in which participants hold intentions for brief periods,
with the option to strategically externalize these intentions by creating a reminder. This task signiﬁ-
cantly predicted participants’ fulﬁlment of a naturalistic intention embedded within their everyday
activities up to one week later (with greater predictive ability than more traditional prospective
memory tasks, albeit with weak effect size). Setting external reminders improved performance, and it
was more prevalent in older adults. Furthermore, participants set reminders adaptively, based on (a)
memory load, and (b) the likelihood of distraction. These results suggest the importance of metacog-
nitive processes in triggering intention ofﬂoading, which can increase the probability that intentions are
eventually fulﬁlled.
Keywords: Distributed cognition; Intentions; Prospective memory; Internet; Metacognition;
Reminders.
Competent behaviour often requires us to form
intentions for future actions, which cannot be ful-
ﬁlled immediately. Several experimental paradigms
have been developed to investigate this ability.
Some of them fall within the domain of “prospective
memory” (PM; Brandimonte, Einstein, &
McDaniel, 1996; Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein,
2008), an umbrella term denoting a variety of pro-
cesses that allow us to fulﬁl delayed intentions, at a
variety of timescales (Craik & Kerr, 1996; Ellis &
Cohen, 2008). PM paradigms typically require par-
ticipants to perform an ongoing task while trying to
remember to perform an intended action when
they encounter a particular cue or at a particular
time. Other conceptually related paradigms have
been described as investigating “multitasking”
(Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello, & Shallice,
2000; Roca et al., 2011), “cognitive branching” or
memory for “pending” intentions (Koechlin, Basso,
Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999), “memory for
goals” (Altmann & Trafton, 2002), “goal neglect”
(Bhandari & Duncan, 2014; Duncan, Emslie,
Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996; Duncan et al.,
2008), and “sustained attention” (Robertson,
Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). These
different terms have been used in related but
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nonidentical ways, and the boundary conditions sep-
arating the various paradigms are not always clear.
Thus, in the present article, the theoretically neutral
term “memory for delayed intentions” is used to
refer to the multiple processes supporting the
execution of intended behaviours that can only be
fulﬁlled after performance of an interposed activity.
One characteristic of the experimental para-
digms referenced above is that they rarely, if ever,
give participants the opportunity to create external
reminders. However, in everyday life we often
augment our memory for delayed intentions with
external artefacts (Hall, Johansson, & de Léon,
2013; Harris, 1980). We tie knots in handkerch-
iefs, make notes in to-do lists and calendars, phys-
ically hold task-relevant objects (e.g., a letter that
needs to be posted), place objects in noticeable
places, or ask friends and partners to remind us.
Today, people increasingly programme time-,
location-, or person-based reminders into smart-
phones (Svoboda, Rowe, & Murphy, 2012). In
other words, we often “outsource” or “ofﬂoad” our
intentions into the external environment, at least
to some degree, rather than relying on a purely
internal representation. In this way, our intentions
are represented in a system that extends beyond
our brains and bodies into distributed physical arte-
facts and our social worlds. In order to understand
how we fulﬁl delayed intentions, it is therefore
important to consider this distributed system.
The phenomenon of distributed cognition is
recognized within many ﬁelds of psychology
(Clark, 1997, 2010; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 1995).
It is also explored in philosophy (Clark &
Chalmers, 2006; Menary, 2010), with implications
and practical applications across many domains
such as user-interface design (Wright, Fields, &
Harrison, 2000). An obvious example is the use of
pen and paper to record information, which can sub-
sequently be consulted rather than relying on
unaided memory. As well as using the external
environment as a repository of representational
information, we also physically interact with the
world to reduce the computational load of sub-
sequent information processing. For example,
expert Tetris players tend to physically rotate
pieces as they fall down the screen to check their
perceptual match with unﬁlled spaces, rather than
relying on a slow and unreliable mental rotation
strategy. Popular behaviour management techniques
such as “getting things done” (Allen, 2002) empha-
size the importance of ofﬂoading intended tasks into
an external memory (Heylighen & Vidal, 2008). In
these ways, we restructure our environment to create
perceptual triggers for appropriate behaviour (Kirsh,
1996), rather than relying on more computationally
demanding cognitive processes.
Theoretical models of how we remember
delayed intentions emphasize the ﬂexible balance
between perceptual triggering (e.g., being
reminded to post a letter by the sight of a
mailbox) versus strategic monitoring (e.g., continu-
ally searching for a mailbox; Gilbert, Hadjipavlou,
& Raoelison, 2013; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000;
Scullin, McDaniel, & Shelton, 2013). While
some studies have investigated the efﬁcacy of exper-
imenter-provided reminders (Guynn, McDaniel,
& Einstein, 1998; Henry, Rendell, Phillips,
Dunlop, & Kliegel, 2012; Loft, Smith, &
Bhaskara, 2011; Vortac, Edwards, & Manning,
1995), the literature on delayed intentions has
rarely examined the ways that we manipulate the
environment ourselves to create perceptual triggers.
One exception to this has been observational
studies of the way that people remember intentions
in workplace settings such as nursing or aviation
(Grundgeiger, Sanderson, MacDougall, &
Venkatesh, 2010; Loukopolous, Dismukes, &
Barshi, 2009). Another exception is the clinical lit-
erature on rehabilitation (Fish, Wilson, & Manly,
2010; Thöne-Otto & Walther, 2008; Wilson,
Emslie, Quirk, & Evans, 2001). However, in
many ways, the problems facing patients are
similar to those faced by neurologically healthy
adults, and failures to fulﬁl delayed intentions are
common even in highly able individuals. In the
words of Duncan (2010, p.93), “the frontal lobe
patient is very much like the rest of us—but more
so”. Yet experimental studies of neurologically
healthy participants have not generally permitted
the creation of external cues (though see Einstein
& McDaniel, 1990, for one exception).
The present study therefore had two aims. The
ﬁrst was to develop a simple task permitting the
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use of an externalizing strategy, to investigate (a)
whether participants voluntarily ofﬂoad intentions,
even when they can use unaided memory alone if
they prefer, and (b) whether intention ofﬂoading is
inﬂuenced by task characteristics, suggesting an
inﬂuence of metacognitive insight into the likeli-
hood of forgetting. Two characteristics were
manipulated: (a) the memory load (i.e., number of
concurrent intentions to be remembered), and (b)
the presence of an interruption in the ongoing task
(Altmann, Trafton, & Hambrick, 2013). Both
factors were hypothesized to increase the difﬁculty
of remembering intentions and thus to prompt
increased intention ofﬂoading. While the exper-
imental task developed here involved intentions
that were delayed only for a few seconds, the
second aim of the present study was to combine
this task with a real-world intention operating
over several days, to test its external validity in pre-
dicting everyday behaviour extended over a longer
timescale.
EXPERIMENT 1A
Method
Intention-ofﬂoading task
Participants completed the task via their computer’s
web browser. On each trial, 10 yellow circles num-
bered 1–10 were positioned randomly within a box
(Figure 1). Participants were instructed to drag the
circles in turn (1, 2, 3, etc.) to the bottom of the
box, using their computer mouse. When each
circle was dragged to the bottom of the box it dis-
appeared, leaving the other circles on the screen.
After the 10th circle had disappeared, the screen
was cleared, and the next trial began (for a demon-
stration, please visit http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sam-
gilbert/demos/circleDemo.html).
Alongside this ongoing task, participants were
provided with delayed intentions on each trial.
They were instructed to drag one circle (1-target
condition) or three circles (3-target condition) to
speciﬁc alternative locations (i.e., left, right, or
top). Thus, participants formed delayed intentions
to perform particular actions when they
encountered prespeciﬁed cues, although they
could produce a standard ongoing response (i.e.,
dragging the circle to the bottom of the box) if
they forgot. However, if they attempted to drag a
target circle to an incorrect target location (left,
top, or right), or if they attempted to drag a nontar-
get circle to any of these locations, it remained on
the screen, allowing participants to realize that
they had made a mistake.
This task permits intention ofﬂoading in a
simple manner: At the beginning of each trial, par-
ticipants could drag the target circles towards their
intended location. From this point on, there is no
need to mentally rehearse the delayed intention
(s). Instead, the locations of the target circles them-
selves represent the intention, providing a percep-
tual trigger when they are reached in the
sequence. An everyday analogue might be leaving
an object by the front door, so that we remember
to take it with us when leaving the house.
Participants were explicitly told that they could
use this strategy if they wished, but they were also
told it was optional and it was up to them
whether to use it. Half of the participants per-
formed the task as described (“no-interruption
group”). The other participants (“interruption
group”) additionally received a distracting arith-
metic question during each trial. This occurred
immediately after dragging one of the nontarget
circles to the bottom of the box, at a position in
the sequence randomly selected between the ﬁrst
circle and the circle immediately before the ﬁrst
target. Each participant completed 20 experimental
trials, 10 in the 1-target condition and 10 in the 3-
target condition, in randomized order. Participants
were instructed to perform the task as quickly and
accurately as possible.
Participants
Participants were recruited from the Amazon
Mechanical Turk website (http://www.mturk.com),
an online marketplace in which participants receive
payment for completion of web-based tasks
(Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). Ethical
approval was received from the UCL (University
College London) Research Ethics Committee, and
informed consent was obtained from all participants.
OFFLOADING INTENTIONS
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Participation was restricted to volunteers living in the
USA, to reduce heterogeneity. A total of 100 partici-
pants were recruited; two were excluded due to poor
arithmetic-veriﬁcation performance (,80%) and
were replaced with a further two participants (ﬁnal
sample: mean age 33 years, range 18–62 years, 43%
male). The experiment took approximately 20 min,
and participants were compensated $2.
Data analysis
There were two dependent measures. Target accu-
racy was the proportion of targets that were
dragged to their instructed location rather than
the bottom of the screen. Only trials in which the
target was dragged to the instructed location on
the ﬁrst attempt were counted as correct (i.e., if a
participant ﬁrst tried to drag a circle to the wrong
location, found that it remained on the screen,
then tried again at the correct location, this was
not counted as correct). Externalizing proportion
was the proportion of targets for which participants
set up an external reminder, by moving it to a new
location before reaching its position in the ongoing
task (see Supplemental Material for full details of
how this was calculated).
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the intention-ofﬂoading task.
GILBERT
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Results
Mean arithmetic-veriﬁcation accuracy was 99%.
The mean retention intervals (i.e., time from the
start of each trial until the ﬁrst target circle was
reached in the sequence) were 13.8 s and 9.0 s in
the interruption and no-interruption groups,
respectively. Other results are summarized in
Figure 2. The mean externalizing proportion was
signiﬁcantly greater than zero in all conditions, t
(49). 5.7, p, .001, d. 1.6, indicating that par-
ticipants did set reminders at least on a proportion
of trials. The externalizing proportion was signiﬁ-
cantly greater for 3-target than 1-target trials, F
(1, 98)= 43, p, .001, η2= .31, and for the inter-
ruption than the no-interruption group, F(1, 98)=
5.2, p= .025, η2= .051. These two factors did not
signiﬁcantly interact (F, 1).
Analysis of target accuracy showed that partici-
pants dragged the target circles to their instructed
locations on a high proportion of trials (.88% in
all conditions). Accuracy was higher for 1-target
than 3-target trials, indicating that participants
were more likely to miss targets when they had a
higher memory load, F(1, 98)= 23.6,
p= .000004, η2= .194. There was no signiﬁcant
difference in accuracy between the interruption
and no-interruption groups, nor did the Group ×
Memory Load factors signiﬁcantly interact, F(1,
98), 0.3, p. .6, η2, .003.
In order to investigate whether intention ofﬂoad-
ing may have functionally contributed to target
accuracy, the correlation between each participant’s
externalizing proportion and target accuracy was
calculated. A signiﬁcant positive correlation was
observed in both the no-interruption (r= .29;
p= .04) and the interruption (r= .46; p= .0008)
groups. In all four conditions, the distribution of
externalizing proportions was bimodal rather than
normally distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test:
all ps, .00002; see Figure 3). Thus, individual par-
ticipants tended to either always or never externalize,
rather than externalizing on an intermediate pro-
portion of trials. Note that an externalizing pro-
portion greater than 1 is possible if participants
move a target circle more than once, before reaching
its position in the sequence.
Discussion
Participants voluntarily created external reminders,
and they did so ﬂexibly based on (a) the mnemonic
demands of the task, and (b) the characteristics of
the ongoing task in which delayed intentions
were embedded. Furthermore, individuals who set
more reminders fulﬁlled their delayed intentions
more often. Individual participants tended to
either always externalize or never do so. This
suggests that there is relatively little advantage in
testing participants for a large number of trials;
instead a design in which a large number of partici-
pants each complete a small number of trials is most
efﬁcient.
Participants’ adaptive use of an externalizing
strategy suggests that their metacognitive awareness
of the likelihood of forgetting (i.e., more likely
when there is a higher memory load, or a more dis-
tracting ongoing task) prompted compensatory off-
loading of intentions (see Maylor, 1990, for a
Figure 2. Mean externalizing proportion and target accuracy in Experiments 1a and 1b. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
OFFLOADING INTENTIONS
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related ﬁnding). However, this interpretation rests
on the untested assumption that interruption
would have impaired participants’ ability to remem-
ber delayed intentions if they had been unable to
ofﬂoad them. The following experiment tests this
assumption.
EXPERIMENT 1B
Method
The same task was administered, except that only
the upcoming circle in the sequence could ever be
dragged; the other circles remained ﬁxed in place
(i.e., Circle 2 could only be moved after Circle 1
had disappeared; Circle 3 could only be moved
after Circle 2 had disappeared, etc.). This made it
impossible to ofﬂoad intentions, and thus inten-
tion-ofﬂoading instructions were not presented.
Methods were otherwise identical to those in
Experiment 1a. In this experiment, and all sub-
sequent experiments reported below, participants
who had already taken part in an earlier experiment
were blocked. This was achieved by blocking the
Amazon Mechanical Turk ID code of any partici-
pant who had taken part in an earlier study, as well
as any IP (Internet protocol) address that had pre-
viously been used to access one of the studies.
Participants
A total of 100 participants were recruited, divided
equally between the interruption and no-interruption
Figure 3. Frequency histograms of the externalizing proportion in each condition. To view this ﬁgure in colour, please visit the online version of
this Journal.
GILBERT
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groups. One participant was replaced due to arith-
metic-veriﬁcation accuracy below 80% (ﬁnal
sample: mean age 31 years, range 18–59 years, 43%
male).
Results
Mean arithmetic-veriﬁcation accuracy was 99%.
The mean retention intervals (which, in this exper-
iment, did not include time spent creating external
reminders) were 11.7 s and 6.8 s in the interruption
and no-interruption groups, respectively. See
Figure 2 for target accuracy. As in Experiment
1a, accuracy was higher for 1-target than 3-target
trials, F(1, 98)= 38.5, p, 10−7, η2= .28.
However, unlike the previous experiment, accuracy
was now lower in the interruption than in the no-
interruption group, F(1, 98)= 10.4, p= .002,
η2= .096. The two factors did not signiﬁcantly
interact, F(1, 98)= 1.9, p= .17, η2= .019. A
cross-experiment comparison showed that the pre-
dicted Experiment × Interruption interaction was
signiﬁcant, F(1, 196)= 6.7, p= .011, η2= .033.
The experiment factor did not interact signiﬁcantly
with any other factor, F(1, 196), 1.8, p. .18,
η2, .09.
Discussion
Interruption clearly impaired the fulﬁlment of
delayed intentions when participants relied on
their unaided memory. But when they could
ofﬂoad intentions in Experiment 1a, it led to
greater ofﬂoading without affecting accuracy. This
suggests that in some circumstances participants
can eliminate the costs of interruption by ofﬂoading
intentions to the external environment. Thus,
intention ofﬂoading can play a compensatory role,
presumably inﬂuenced by metacognitive insight
into the conditions likely to disrupt performance.
Having shown that participants adaptively set
external reminders in a laboratory task, an
obvious question remains. What reason is there
to believe that the present intention ofﬂoading/
control tasks relate to the real-world behaviours
of interest when we try to remember delayed
intentions in everyday life? It might be hoped
that laboratory investigations of tasks requiring
participants to execute delayed intentions will
relate to important real-world behaviours such as
remembering to take medication, to attend
appointments, and so on. However, it is not
clear that the present experimental tasks have any
real-world signiﬁcance, unless they can be shown
to relate in some way to a theoretically relevant
naturalistic behaviour. Experiment 2 seeks to
address this question by investigating the relation-
ship between the present experimental paradigm
and a naturalistic intention embedded into partici-
pants’ everyday lives over a period of days, rather
than seconds. A further aim of Experiment 2
was to test the possibility that the intention-off-
loading task administered in Experiment 1a
might correlate better with naturalistic PM than
the nonofﬂoading control task administered in
Experiment 1b. This is because only the former
task allows participants to set external reminders,
like many real-world situations, but in contrast
with standard laboratory tasks.
EXPERIMENT 2
In the introduction to this article, a variety of meth-
odological approaches were described for exper-
imentally assessing participants’ ability to
remember delayed intentions. One of the most
striking differences between these paradigms is
the retention interval—that is, the time between
encoding an intention and the opportunity to act
on it. Whereas the tasks administered in
Experiment 1 had a short retention interval, on
the order of 5 to 15 s on average, real-world inten-
tions operate over a wide variety of durations,
ranging from a few seconds (e.g., momentarily
delaying a pending task during periods of high
workload in an aviation setting) to periods of
minutes, hours, days, or longer (e.g., remembering
to attend a planned hospital appointment). It is
therefore an open question how much overlap
there is between processes that allow us to fulﬁl
“immediate intentions”, delayed by just a few
seconds, versus delayed intentions operating over
longer periods.
OFFLOADING INTENTIONS
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In the literature on prospective memory, a dis-
tinction has been made between “vigilance” tasks,
potentially involving conscious rehearsal of a
delayed intention over a short time scale, versus
“PM proper”, in which participants do not continu-
ously rehearse their delayed intention but instead
must bring it back to consciousness at the appropri-
ate time (Graf & Uttl, 2001). The present inten-
tion-ofﬂoading task would be more akin to a
vigilance task than PM-proper, according to this
terminology. While delayed intention tasks operat-
ing over different timescales will undoubtedly rely
on at least partially distinct mechanisms, it is not
clear to what extent they also overlap. For
example, rostral prefrontal cortex appears to play a
prominent role in prospective memory in everyday
life (Burgess, 2000; Uretzky & Gilboa, 2010) as
well as remembering intentions for just a few
seconds (Gilbert, 2011), whereas more posterior
frontal regions respond more strongly to standard
working memory tasks (Reynolds, West, &
Braver, 2009). This suggests that there may be
some overlap between the processes that allow the
realization of intentions over a few seconds and
those operating over longer timescales; however,
the inferential basis for this type of “reverse infer-
ence”, arguing for shared cognitive process on the
basis of similar neurophysiological response, is rela-
tively weak (Poldrack, 2006, 2011). Thus, the fol-
lowing experiment investigates behaviourally
whether the present experimental paradigms can
be related to participants’ fulﬁlment of naturalistic
intentions operating over longer periods of time
and embedded within everyday activities. In order
to do this, participants’ performance of the tasks
administered in Experiment 1 was measured,
along with a more naturalistic measure of their
real-world ability to fulﬁl delayed intentions over
a longer period. Performance of more traditional
(a) event- and (b) time-based PM tasks was also
investigated, requiring participants to act on a
delayed intention (a) when a particular cue
occurred, or (b) at a particular time. Participants
additionally performed a lexical decision task
within which these two PM tasks were embedded,
yielding a more general measure of cognitive ability
and task engagement (note that Ratcliff, Thapar, &
McKoon, 2010, Table 4, found a correlation of .72
between lexical decision accuracy and Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale–Third Edition, WAIS–
III, IQ).
Method: Experiment 2a
Tasks
Intention-ofﬂoading/Nonofﬂoading task. Participants
in the ofﬂoading condition performed the same
task as that in Experiment 1a (permitting intention
ofﬂoading), whereas participants in the nonofﬂoad-
ing condition performed the same task as that in
Experiment 1b (disallowing intention ofﬂoading).
In both cases, only the no-interruption version
was administered. As in Experiment 1, participants
performed 10 trials with one target and 10 trials
with three targets.
Lexical decision task. Participants were presented
with a sequence of upper-case letter strings (3–5
letters). They responded with their right middle
ﬁnger to words (50% of trials) and their right
index ﬁnger to nonwords. After each response the
stimulus was removed, and the next trial followed
after 150 ms. Participants were instructed to
perform the task as quickly and accurately as
possible.
Event-based PM task. Participants performed the
lexical decision task described above, with the
additional instruction that if they saw an animal
word (e.g., COW) they should press a button
with their left index ﬁnger instead. A total of 265
trials were performed, including 10 targets.
Time-based PM task. Participants again performed
the lexical decision task. They were also asked to
press a button with their left index ﬁnger every 30
s. They were told that they needed to make this
response within 3 s of the correct time for it to
count. Participants could press a button with their
left middle ﬁnger at any point to reveal a digital
clock at the top of the screen. This indicated the
time since the beginning of the task, staying on
the screen for 1500 ms. The task lasted for 310 s,
yielding 10 opportunities to make a PM response.
GILBERT
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Naturalistic PM task.. Participants were informed
that they had the opportunity to earn three bonus
payments of $0.25. They were provided with a
unique weblink and were instructed that they
would earn $0.25 if they visited this link on three
named dates that were 2, 5, and 7 days after the
test. Participants completed the experiment on a
Wednesday, so the dates for the bonuses were the
following Friday, Monday, and Wednesday. They
were also asked at this point whether they intended
to claim each of the three bonuses. Only partici-
pants reporting an intention to claim all three
bonuses were included in data analysis.
Procedure
After providing consent, participants performed
the tasks in counterbalanced order, with the con-
straint that the two lexical decision tasks were per-
formed successively. Prior to these two tasks,
participants ﬁrst performed 20 practice trials of
the lexical decision task alone. Instructions for the
time- and event-based PM tasks were provided
immediately prior to task performance, and for
the second of these tasks participants were
informed that the previous PM instructions no
longer applied. The instructions for the naturalistic
PM task were presented at the end of the session,
after performance of the other tasks. Participation
took approximately 20–30 minutes, for which par-
ticipants received $2.
Participants
A total of 675 participants were recruited (mean
age: 32 years, range 18–67 years; 49% male; 337
in the ofﬂoading condition and 338 in the nonof-
ﬂoading condition). After applying planned exclu-
sion criteria to ensure adequate performance of all
tasks and an intention to claim all three bonuses
(see Supplemental Material), 439 participants
were retained for analysis (217 in the ofﬂoading
condition and 222 in the nonofﬂoading condition;
mean age: 31 years, range 18–62 years; 51% male).
Method: Experiment 2b
One concern with the intention ofﬂoading/nonof-
ﬂoading task administered in Experiment 2a is
that target accuracy is generally high, resulting in
little variance in performance. In order to reduce
possible ceiling effects, an additional study was
conducted in which participants performed a
more difﬁcult version of the task. There were
two changes. First, participants were required to
perform an interleaved task between receiving
the instructions for each trial and beginning to
drag circles to the bottom of the screen. A set
of eight blue circles appeared at the bottom of
the screen, each containing a letter. Participants
were required to rearrange these circles so that
they spelled the word “CONTINUE” from left
to right, upon which they disappeared, and the
task could be continued. This led to a much
longer retention interval; however, intention off-
loading in the ofﬂoading group was permitted
before this interposed task was attempted. The
second discrepancy with Experiment 2a was that
the numbered circles were not always yellow but
were ﬁlled with a variety of colours (black,
brown, blue, red, green, yellow, orange, white,
pink, and grey). Target circles were speciﬁed in
terms of their colour rather than their number
(e.g., please drag the blue circle to the left). The
allocation of colours to numbers was randomly
chosen on each trial. This change was based on
the distinction in the PM literature between
“focal” and “nonfocal” tasks. Focal tasks are
those in which the stimulus characteristic deﬁning
the target(s) overlaps with a characteristic that
must also be attended in order to perform the
ongoing task (e.g., in Experiment 2a the
numbers that deﬁne the target circles must also
be attended in order to drag the nontarget
circles in sequence to the bottom of the screen).
By contrast, the target-deﬁning characteristic in
Experiment 2b was not relevant to the ongoing
task. Note that nonfocal PM tasks have been pro-
posed to rely on top-down monitoring to a greater
degree than focal tasks (Scullin, McDaniel, &
Einstein, 2010). Thus the aim of this experimen-
tal manipulation was not to reduce the extent to
which the intention ofﬂoading task required
target monitoring—that is, “vigilance” as
opposed to “PM-proper”. Rather, the aim of this
manipulation was to depress performance levels
OFFLOADING INTENTIONS
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so that there might be greater variance between
participants which might be related to the other
measures. Apart from these adjustments to the
intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task, the pro-
cedure in Experiment 2b was identical to that in
Experiment 2a.
Participants
A total of 826 participants were recruited (mean
age: 32 years, range 18–68 years; 46% male; 449
randomly allocated to the ofﬂoading condition,
377 to the nonofﬂoading condition). After apply-
ing identical exclusion criteria to Experiment 3a,
557 participants were retained for analysis (303 in
the ofﬂoading condition and 254 in the nonof-
ﬂoading condition; mean age: 32 years, range 18–
67 years; 48% male).
Results
Task performance is summarized in Table 1.
Performance on all measures was similar between
Experiments 2a and 2b (comparison between
experiments: all ps. .19), except for the inten-
tion-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task, which in
Experiment 2b was performed with lower accuracy,
F(1, 992)= 63, p, 10−12, η2= .06, and with a
greater externalizing proportion in the ofﬂoading
group, F(1, 518)= 111, p, 10−22, η2= .18.
Collapsing across the two experiments and the
two groups (ofﬂoading and nonofﬂoading), 47%
of participants failed to claim any bonuses, despite
reporting that they intended to claim all three,
11% claimed one bonus, 13% claimed two
bonuses, and 28% claimed three. These results are
consistent with previous studies indicating large
discrepancies between participants’ self-reported
intentions and their subsequent behaviour in real-
world tasks (Sheeran, 2002). Furthermore, the dis-
tribution of scores shows that participants were
most likely to claim all of the bonuses or none of
them, rather than an intermediate number. The
number of bonuses claimed did not differ
between participants in the two experiments and
two groups, χ2(9)= 13.7, p= .13. Lexical decision
reaction times (RTs) were longer in the event-
based than in the time-based condition, F(1,
994)= 544, p, 10−95, η2= .35, potentially as a
result of additional processing of each word in the
event-based task to check its target status, before
making a response.
Table 1. Performance measures in Experiments 2a and 2b
Experiment 2a Experiment 2b
Nonofﬂoading Ofﬂoading Nonofﬂoading Ofﬂoading
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Event-based PM task
Lexical decision (RT/ms) 768 114 764 114 780 137 777 127
Lexical decision (% correct) 95.3 2.6 95.1 2.5 95.1 2.7 95.1 2.8
PM (% hits) 67.8 20.2 67.4 20.0 68.5 19.7 67.1 19.8
Time-based PM task
Lexical decision (RT/ms) 713 111 718 114 721 115 723 118
Lexical decision (% correct) 95.1 2.9 94.9 3.4 94.9 3.3 95.3 2.8
PM (% hits) 82.7 21.8 83.5 20.7 79.0 24.4 81.9 22.5
Intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task
1-target condition (% hits) 93.7 9.5 94.7 7.8 84.1 16.1 92.6 10.3
3-target condition (% hits) 88.2 11.5 90.6 9.3 79.8 18.3 89.1 11.5
1-target condition (externalizing proportion) — — .33 .42 — — .75 .40
3-target condition (externalizing proportion) — — .67 .45 — — .90 .30
Naturalistic PM (% bonuses claimed) 38.9 41.5 41.0 43.8 42.5 44.3 40.9 43.9
Note: PM = prospective memory; RT = reaction time.
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In Experiment 2a the mean retention intervals
were 9.7 s and 7.3 s in the ofﬂoading and nonof-
ﬂoading groups, respectively; the equivalent
ﬁgures in Experiment 2b were 24.4 s and 26.0 s.
In the ofﬂoading condition, the externalizing pro-
portion was signiﬁcantly greater for 3-target than
for 1-target trials, as in Experiment 1a
[Experiment 2a: F(1, 216)= 158; p, 10−26;
η2= .42; Experiment 2b: F(1, 302)= 73; p,
10−15; η2= .20]. In both experiments, target accu-
racy was signiﬁcantly higher in the ofﬂoading than
in the nonofﬂoading groups [Experiment 2a: F(1,
437)= 4.8; p= .029; η2= .011; Experiment 2b:
F(1, 555)= 71.7, p, 10−15; η2= .11], indicating
that intention ofﬂoading functionally contributed
to performance.
Correlations between performance measures are
shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows results col-
lapsed over all 996 participants, which is most
appropriate for evaluating the naturalistic PM,
event-based PM, time-based PM, and lexical
decision accuracy measures, seeing as these were
identical for all participants (furthermore, ongoing
lexical decision accuracy was collapsed over the
event-based and time-based task). The intention-
ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task is also included for
reference, collapsed over the 1-target and 3-target
trials for all participants. Table 3 shows the
results from these measures separately for the two
experiments and two groups of participants (off-
loading and nonofﬂoading).
Considering Table 2 to begin with, the corre-
lation coefﬁcients between the accuracy measures
were universally positive, as commonly found in
such analyses of psychometric tests (Spearman,
1904). However, perhaps surprisingly, the time-
and event-based PM tasks were not signiﬁcantly
correlated, suggesting that they are supported by
distinct cognitive mechanisms. Both tasks were sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with the intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading task, indicating their reliability as
measures. They were also signiﬁcantly correlated
with lexical decision accuracy, particularly the
event-based task, potentially due to the shared
reliance of the ongoing and target-detection
demands on lexical processing. Correlations
between the naturalistic PM task and other
measures were modest but nevertheless signiﬁcant
for the event-based PM task (p= .025) and
lexical decision task (p= .027), marginally signiﬁ-
cant for the time-based PM task (p= .069), and
highly signiﬁcant for the intention-ofﬂoading/non-
ofﬂoading task (p= .00004).
Turning now to the subsamples shown in Table
3, the only signiﬁcant correlation between the nat-
uralistic PM task and the other accuracy measures,
after Bonferroni correction for 16 tests (four
measures × four groups) was with the nonofﬂoad-
ing task of Experiment 2b (corrected p= .005). At
an uncorrected threshold, the naturalistic PM task
had at least a marginally signiﬁcant correlation
with the intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task
in three of the four groups. The other tasks each
had at least a marginally signiﬁcant correlation
with the naturalistic PM task in one of the four
groups.
Table 2. Correlations between measures collected in Experiments 2a and 2b
Naturalistic PM Event-based PM Time-based PM
Intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading
Lexical decision
accuracy
Naturalistic PM — .07* .06# .13*** .07*
Event-based PM — .02 .18*** .43***
Time-based PM — .14*** .10**
Intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading
— .25***
Lexical decision accuracy
Note: PM = prospective memory.
#p, .1. *p, .05. **p, .01. ***p, .001.
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It thus appears that the validity of the experimental
tasks for predicting naturalistic PM performance was
low, but somewhat higher for the intention-ofﬂoad-
ing/nonofﬂoading task than for the other measures.
In order to further examine this possibility, amultiple
regression was conducted, attempting to predict the
number of bonuses claimed in the naturalistic
PM task from (a) event-based PM accuracy; (b)
time-based PM accuracy; (c) lexical decision accu-
racy; (d) intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading
task; (e) Intention-Ofﬂoading/Nonofﬂoading×
Experiment interaction; (f) Intention-Ofﬂoading/
Nonofﬂoading×Group interaction; (g) Intention-
Ofﬂoading/Nonofﬂoading×Experiment×Group
interaction. Of these seven predictors, only one was
signiﬁcant: intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task
performance [standardized beta= .13, t(988)= 3.8,
p= .00017; all other predictors: t(988), 1.8,
p. .07]. This result was not due to collinearity
between the event-based PM, time-based PM, and
lexical decision measures. When the same analysis
was run three times, comparing the intention-off-
loading/nonofﬂoading task with the other tasks one
by one, the intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading pre-
dictor was always highly signiﬁcant, t(990). 4.0,
p, .00005, but none of the other three was, t
(990), 1.35, p. .17. Thus, the intention-ofﬂoad-
ing/nonofﬂoading task outperformed each of the
three othermeasures for explaining variance in natur-
alistic PM, even when these measures were con-
sidered individually. Furthermore, bootstrap tests
(Grömping, 2006) to directly compare the relative
importance of the intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoad-
ing task against the other three measures (using a
default of 1000 bootstrap runs) yielded an effect at
p, .1 in each case.
In order to test whether the predictive validity of
the intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task was
jointly signiﬁcant in the ofﬂoading and nonofﬂoad-
ing groups, the regression analysis was repeated
separately for each group, after dropping predictors
(f) and (g). In both independent samples, the inten-
tion-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task uniquely pre-
dicted the number of bonuses claimed
[ofﬂoading: t(514)= 2.1, p= .038; nonofﬂoading:
t(470)= 3.5, p= .0005; all other tasks: p. .09].
In the nonofﬂoading group, there was also a signiﬁ-
cant effect of the regressor representing the
Nonofﬂoading Task × Experiment interaction, t
(470)= 2.3, p= .024, indicating that the predictive
Table 3. Correlations between measures collected in Experiments 2a and 2b, separately for the two experiments and two groups
Naturalistic
PM
Event-based
PM
Time-based
PM
Intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading
Lexical decision
accuracy
Experiment 2a
Naturalistic PM — .05 .12# .09 .19**
Event-based PM .02 — .11 .24*** .44***
Time-based PM .10 .03 — .22** .18**
Intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading
.15* .25*** .19** — .41***
Lexical decision accuracy .08 .41*** .14* .23*** —
Externalising proportion −.02 −.02 .00 .11 −.01
Experiment 2b
Naturalistic PM — .04 .01 .22*** .01
Event-based PM .15** — .04 .26*** .45***
Time-based PM .04 −.05 — .06 .09
Intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading
.10# .12* .13* — .26***
Lexical decision accuracy .04 .43** .02 .19*** —
Externalizing proportion −.02 .08 −.07 .32*** .09
Note: PM = prospective memory. Shaded cells: intention-ofﬂoading group; white cells: nonofﬂoading group.
#p, .1. *p, .05. **p, .01. ***p, .001.
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validity of the measure was greater in the more
difﬁcult version of the task. However, in the
ofﬂoading group the predictive validity of the
intention-ofﬂoading task did not differ between
the easy and the difﬁcult versions of the task, t
(514)= 0.20, p= .84. The relationship between
number of bonuses claimed in the naturalistic
PM task and mean performance in the intentio-
n-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task is shown in
Figure 4.
These results might reﬂect, trivially, the fact
that there were more targets in the intention-
ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task (20 trials, half of
which had three targets) than in the event- and
time-based PM tasks (10 targets each), perhaps
leading to additional statistical power for this
measure. In order to test this possibility, the mul-
tiple regressions were repeated using only 1-target
performance as a predictor rather than the col-
lapsed score, so that the intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading task was matched to the PM
tasks in having only 10 targets. Results remained
similar: The intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading
task uniquely predicted the number of bonuses
claimed when combining across the two groups,
t(988)= 3.2, p= .001, and also in both indepen-
dent samples [ofﬂoading: t(514)= 2.3, p= .02;
nonofﬂoading: t(470)= 2.6, p= .01; all other
tasks: p. .09].
Another concern is that mean performance of
the intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task was
relatively high, leading to possible ceiling effects.
However, if anything this would reduce its ability
to capture variance related to the naturalistic PM
task, whereas in fact it was a better predictor than
the event- and time-based PM tasks, which were
performed with lower accuracy. The number of
bonuses claimed formed a non-normal (bimodal)
distribution, violating one of the assumptions for
signiﬁcance testing of Pearson correlations. While
it has been suggested that the Pearson correlation
is “extremely robust” and can withstand violations
of assumptions such as normality (Field, 2000,
p. 87), it is nevertheless necessary to examine
whether this could have compromised signiﬁcance
testing of the correlation between the naturalistic
PM task and other measures, particularly the inten-
tion-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task, which showed
the highest correlation. To test this possibility,
the naturalistic PM variable was randomly shufﬂed,
and its correlation with the intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading target accuracy was calculated. This
procedure was repeated 1,000,000 times for each
of the four conditions shown in Table 3, as well
as the collapsed data shown in Table 2. In every
case, 5.0% of these tests produced a signiﬁcant
result at p, .05, apart from Experiment 2a, nonof-
ﬂoading group, where 4.9% of tests were signiﬁ-
cant. Thus, Type 1 errors were appropriately
controlled.
One of the aims of Experiment 2 was to inves-
tigate whether allowing participants to set external
reminders might increase the external validity of
the intention-ofﬂoading task, relative to the nonof-
ﬂoading control task. In fact, there was no signiﬁ-
cant difference between the two versions of the
task, and, if anything, the association with the nat-
uralistic PMmeasure was numerically greater in the
nonofﬂoading task. However, it should be noted
that allowing participants to ofﬂoad intentions
boosted their performance, thus reducing variance
that could be linked with naturalistic PM perform-
ance. In order to examine the potential inﬂuence of
this factor, an additional analysis was undertaken,
Figure 4. Target accuracy in the intention-ofﬂoading/control task
against the number of bonuses claimed in the naturalistic PM
(prospective memory) task. Error bars indicate standard error of
the mean.
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in which the ofﬂoading and nonofﬂoading groups
were matched in performance. This was achieved
by repeatedly removing the best scoring participant
in the ofﬂoading group and the worst-scoring par-
ticipant in the nonofﬂoading group, separately for
each experiment, until the two groups were as
closely matched as possible. As a result, 10 partici-
pants in each group (5%) were removed from
Experiment 2a, and 58 (21%) from Experiment
2b (seeing as there was a greater difference
between the two groups in Experiment 2b, this
required the removal of more participants). The
resulting mean target accuracies were 92.27%/
92.25% in the ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading groups of
Experiment 2a, and 88.72%/88.83% in
Experiment 2b. Correlations between the inten-
tion-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task and the natura-
listic PM measure were then recalculated, yielding
the following results: Experiment 2a ofﬂoading:
r= .15, p= .03, nonofﬂoading: r= .09, p= .19;
Experiment 2b ofﬂoading: r= .11, p= .08, nonof-
ﬂoading: r= .06, p= .43. Thus, after matching
groups for mean target accuracy, the intention-off-
loading task signiﬁcantly predicted naturalistic PM
in Experiment 2a, and did so marginally signiﬁ-
cantly in Experiment 2b, but there was no signiﬁ-
cant correlation with the nonofﬂoading task in
either experiment. Collapsing across both exper-
iments, the predictive validity of the intention-off-
loading task was highly signiﬁcant (p= .009) but
the predictive validity of the nonofﬂoading task
was not signiﬁcant (p= .36). Nevertheless, the
difference between these associations was not
itself statistically reliable (p= .25).
Discussion
Two features of the naturalistic PM task are par-
ticularly striking. First, participants performed
quite poorly: Even though all analysed participants
reported an intention to claim all three bonuses,
about half failed to claim a single one. Second,
the number of bonuses collected was only weakly
related to performance of the experimental tasks.
There are a number of reasons why this might be:
Some participants may have lost their note of the
weblink used to claim their bonuses, or copied it
down incorrectly; they may have lacked motivation
to claim small bonuses of only $0.25; they may have
had technical problems preventing them from
accessing the speciﬁed weblink (e.g., internet con-
nectivity problems); they may have found them-
selves unexpectedly busy or away from their
computers on the speciﬁed days (up to a week
away), and so on. The naturalistic PM score is
therefore likely to be an exceedingly noisy
measure, a problem exacerbated by the collection
of only three “trials”.
In this context, it is perhaps also striking that
predictions of naturalistic PM from the intention-
ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task were nevertheless
highly statistically signiﬁcant (p, .00008), albeit
reﬂecting a weak effect size (η2= .022). This
relationship is unlikely to merely reﬂect general
motivation/engagement with the experimental
tasks. The lexical decision measure was pooled
from hundreds of trials and yet the 1-target inten-
tion-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading measure, drawn
from just 10 trials and with many participants per-
forming at ceiling, was the best predictor of natur-
alistic PM in two independent samples (note that
although lexical decision accuracy was generally
high, no participant scored a perfect 100%, indicat-
ing that ceiling effects were avoided). This suggests
that the intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task is
of interest as a paradigm that captures variance
related to a theoretically interesting real-world be-
haviour. Indeed, the intention-ofﬂoading/nonof-
ﬂoading task uniquely predicted variance in this
behaviour when controlling for all other measures.
In the time- and event-based PM tasks, partici-
pants were informed of the delayed intentions
immediately prior to task performance. Although
performance of these tasks was somewhat below
ceiling, suggesting that participants did not con-
tinuously rehearse their delayed intentions
throughout these tasks, it is unclear whether other
PM tasks involving longer, distraction-ﬁlled, reten-
tion intervals might be more likely to predict natur-
alistic PM. A study by Uttl and Kibreab (2011)
found that naturalistic PM was not predicted by
such a task, while the best predictor of naturalistic
PM in the present study was a task with a relatively
GILBERT
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brief retention interval. Nevertheless, this is an
interesting question for future research.
Even when analysis of the intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading task was restricted to the 10 trials in
the 1-target condition, this task was a better predic-
tor of naturalistic PM than the event- and time-
based PM tasks. One possible explanation of this
might be that it involved encoding of 10 different
intentions, one for each trial, as opposed to 10
opportunities to fulﬁl a single intention as in the
event- and time-based tasks. This could have led
to a better sampling of processes related to encod-
ing new intentions, rather than simply maintaining
and acting on a single established intention.
Related to this possibility, the use of a single inten-
tion in the event- and time-based tasks could have
led to a progressive automatization of the PM
response in these tasks, reducing the validity of
the more traditional PM tasks for predicting the
fulﬁlment of a novel intention. By contrast, the
intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task may have
required participants to manage interference
between currently relevant and previously relevant
intentions, which may more accurately reﬂect
everyday PM. In order to engage such processes
in the more traditional PM tasks, it would be
necessary to switch between multiple intentions
rather than acting on a single intention throughout.
It is debatable whether the intention-ofﬂoading/
nonofﬂoading task should be considered an
example of a PM task or not. Certainly, this task
requires participants to retain intentions over a
shorter timescale than standard PM paradigms, and
it seems more likely to involve continuous rehearsal
of an intention over the retention period, rather
than bringing the intention to mind at the appropri-
ate moment. It might be more appropriately con-
sidered a working memory (WM) rather than a
PM task. However, the conceptual advance engen-
dered by this label is unclear, seeing as WM is
itself an umbrella term encompassing diverse exper-
imental paradigms, from maintenance of perceptual,
spatial or verbal information to complex “n-back” and
“span” tasks, with uncertain construct validity (Kane,
Conway, Miura, & Colﬂesh, 2007; Shallice &
Cooper, 2011). Rather than debating this terminolo-
gical question, it is perhaps more fruitful merely to
note two points. (a) The intention-ofﬂoading/nonof-
ﬂoading task undoubtedly requires participants to act
on a delayed intention, in the sense that they are pro-
vided with an instruction on each trial that they can
only fulﬁl after a (brief) ﬁlled delay; and (b) it is an
open question to what extent the processes contribut-
ing to this task overlap with those studied in tra-
ditional PM paradigms operating over longer time
periods. Nevertheless, the intention-ofﬂoading/non-
ofﬂoading task was the best predictor of participants’
fulﬁlment of a theoretically interesting behaviour—
that is, acting on a naturalistic intention delayed for
up to one week, embedded within everyday activities.
This provides an empirical demonstration of its rel-
evance to the process of remembering delayed inten-
tions in everyday life. These points stand regardless of
whether the intention-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task
is itself classiﬁed as a PM task, aWM task, or indeed
some other sort of task. Further studies, perhaps
involving a larger battery of tests, might help to delin-
eate in more detail the properties that confer external
validity for predicting naturalistic PM onto an exper-
imental task.
Investigation of age effects
Previous studies of PM have noted a divergence
between laboratory-based and real-world tasks.
For instance, although age-related deﬁcits in lab-
oratory tasks have consistently been reported
(Uttl, 2008), there is little evidence for an equival-
ent deﬁcit in naturalistic tasks, with some studies
even reporting age-related improvement (Phillips,
Henry, & Martin, 2008). This is the “age-related
PM paradox”. Some authors have suggested that
this divergence may be accounted for, at least in
part, by more frequent or effective use of external
reminders in older participants as a compensatory
mechanism (see Maylor, 2008; Phillips et al.,
2008, for discussion). Moreover, ageing has been
hypothesized to lead to an increasing reliance on
environmental support across a range of tasks, not
just those involving PM (Lindenberger & Mayr,
2014). Thus, although it is not the main focus of
the present studies, it is potentially interesting to
investigate whether older participants made
greater use of external reminders in the intention-
OFFLOADING INTENTIONS
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ofﬂoading task. Of the 1196 participants contribut-
ing to the analyses reported above, the median age
was 29 years with a range from 18–67 years; 214
participants (18%) were 40 or above, 91 (8%)
were 50 or above, and 18 (2%) were 60 or above.
Previous analyses have suggested that age differ-
ences in PM are small until participants are in
their 50s or 60s (Uttl, 2008), but detectible at a
younger age if the sample is large enough (Logie
& Maylor, 2009).
In the present studies, correlation coefﬁcients
between age and externalizing proportion were gen-
erally positive but nonsigniﬁcant (Experiment 1a:
r= .12, p= .22; Experiment 2a: r= .13, p= .05;
Experiment 2b: r= .11, p= .07). In order to pool
these results into a single analysis, a multiple
regression was conducted to predict each partici-
pant’s externalizing proportion from their age,
along with dummy variables coding for each of the
separate experiments. This revealed a signiﬁcant
positive relationship between age and externalizing
proportion, t(616)= 3.0, p= .003. A further analy-
sis attempting to predict target accuracy in the inten-
tion-ofﬂoading task did not show an effect of age,
t(616)= 0.06, p= .95. However, for participants
performing the nonofﬂoading task there was a sig-
niﬁcant positive relationship with age, t(572)=
1.99, p= .047. In order to follow up this ﬁnding,
an additional regression analysis was conducted in
which all participants were included, with regressors
representing age, group (ofﬂoading, nonofﬂoading),
and Age×Group interaction, and dummy variables
representing the different experiments. This showed
a positive effect of age, t(1190)= 1.97, p= .049,
and also a signiﬁcant effect of group, t(1190)=
3.8, p, .0002 (i.e., performance was better in the
ofﬂoading group). However, the Age × Group
interaction was not signiﬁcant, t(1190)= 1.3,
p= .21. Thus, there was no signiﬁcant difference
between the age effects in the ofﬂoading versus non-
ofﬂoading groups, and, furthermore, the absence of a
relationship in the ofﬂoading group may have been
related to a ceiling effect due to better performance
in this condition.
In a ﬁnal set of analyses, the correlations
between age and the other experimental tasks
were calculated (collapsed across Experiments 2a
and 2b, seeing as these tasks were identical in the
two experiments). This showed that age was posi-
tively correlated with lexical decision accuracy
(r= .26, p, 10−15), positively correlated with
event-based PM (r= .30, p, 10–21), and nega-
tively correlated with time-based PM (r=−.23,
p, 10−12). Thus, older adults generally outper-
formed younger participants (possibly due to moti-
vational factors, greater conscientiousness, etc.), but
an age-related deﬁcit in time-based PM was never-
theless revealed, consistent with previous results
suggesting that age effects may be particularly pro-
nounced in such tasks (e.g., Park, Hertzog, Kidder,
Morrell, & Mayhorn, 1997).
In sum, the results were consistent with the
hypothesis that older participants might be more
likely to set external reminders to help remember
delayed intentions. However, this result should be
interpreted with caution, especially insofar as it
relates the possibility of intention ofﬂoading as a
compensatory strategy in older adults. First, it is
not clear how well older and younger participants
from Amazon Mechanical Turk are matched,
seeing as there was little demographic information
available about the participants. Second, seeing as
older participants generally performed better on
the experimental tasks, this ﬁnding might simply
reﬂect greater motivation to perform the task well
in older adults rather than any compensatory
effect (indeed, there was no evidence that older
adults had anything to compensate for in inten-
tion-ofﬂoading/nonofﬂoading task). When age
was included as an additional independent vari-
able/covariate in the analyses investigating the
relationship between naturalistic PM and the
experimental tasks, all results were similar.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study investigated the relatively unexplored
topic of intention ofﬂoading: acting on one’s
environment to create perceptual triggers for
delayed intentions. Results of Experiment 1
showed that participants ofﬂoad intentions adap-
tively, on the basis of the cognitive load of the
task. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that the
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intention-ofﬂoading task and its matched nonof-
ﬂoading control task were the best predictors of
participants’ likelihood of fulﬁlling a delayed inten-
tion integrated into their daily activities over a
one-week period, indicating that the experimental
paradigm had signiﬁcant, albeit weak, external val-
idity. Participants were more likely to ofﬂoad inten-
tions if (a) they had a greater memory load; (b) they
encountered interruptions during the retention
interval; and (c) they were older.
Experimental paradigms investigating partici-
pants’ ability to fulﬁl delayed intentions typically
do not permit intention ofﬂoading. Yet intention
ofﬂoading was functionally related to task perform-
ance in the present studies—it boosted target accu-
racy. This suggests that typical experimental
paradigms may miss additional variance contribut-
ing to performance when intention ofﬂoading is
permitted. Understanding the metacognitive
mechanisms contributing to intention ofﬂoading
and other strategies may therefore provide
additional understanding of the factors leading to
the fulﬁlment of delayed intentions, beyond those
measured by the performance of unaided tasks.
Consistent with this suggestion, after matching
the intention-ofﬂoading and nonofﬂoading task
versions for mean target accuracy, only the inten-
tion-ofﬂoading task predicted performance of a
naturalistic PM task. This suggests that allowing
participants to set reminders increases the external
validity of the task. However, seeing as the direct
comparison between the two conditions did not
show a signiﬁcant difference, it is not possible to
draw strong conclusions from this result.
Investigating intention-ofﬂoading strategies is
potentially of practical signiﬁcance. For example,
the use of such strategies is presumably more amen-
able to behaviour-change interventions than par-
ticipants’ underlying unaided ability. With the
development and widespread use of technological
innovations such as smartphone reminder appli-
cations, delayed intentions can reliably be triggered
in many situations (e.g., those involving time- or
location-based cueing), if appropriate steps are
taken in advance. Knowledge of the metacognitive
and situational (e.g., ergonomic) factors that con-
tribute to such steps being taken is therefore
potentially important for improving the fulﬁlment
of delayed intentions in everyday life (see
Rummel & Meiser, 2013, for further discussion
of the inﬂuence of metacognition on behaviour in
a PM setting). Figure 3 suggested that few partici-
pants changed their ofﬂoading strategy from trial to
trial. It is therefore an interesting question what
factors might underlie individual differences in
propensity to set reminders, even when the task is
held constant. This is likely to involve a complex
interplay of metacognitive and motivational
factors (see Gilbert, 2014, for evidence that subjec-
tive conﬁdence and objective ability independently
predict the use of external reminders). It might be
argued that once a reminder has been set, PM—
at least as deﬁned by some researchers—is no
longer required, because the intended action can
be directly cued. According to this view, the term
“prospective memory” should be reserved for
those situations that do not include the use of exter-
nal artefacts. There is not necessarily any objective
criterion by which to judge this terminological
question. However, whatever one’s view, reaching
a broad understanding of the mechanisms that con-
tribute to the fulﬁlment of delayed intentions is of
practical signiﬁcance, whether or not those mech-
anisms fall under a narrow deﬁnition of PM.
Intention ofﬂoading is not the only strategy that
can be used to support the fulﬁlment of delayed
intentions. It is therefore an interesting question
as to what extent the metacognitive factors that
lead to the triggering of different strategies are
similar or distinct. For example, another common
strategy is the use of “implementation intentions”
(Gilbert, Gollwitzer, Cohen, Burgess, &
Oettingen, 2009; Gollwitzer, 1999), where an
intended thought or action is mentally linked
with a speciﬁc anticipated situational cue.
Intention ofﬂoading might be seen as an extreme
form of implementation intention, where not only
is an intention linked to an anticipated cue, but
the agent physically interacts with the world to
create a perceptual cue with a preexisting link to
the intended behaviour. Thus, both strategies
involve a form of prospection or simulation to
anticipate the likely circumstances that will
provide an appropriate trigger for a delayed
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intention (e.g., while forming an intention to make
a phone call at 11 am tomorrow, I might think of
my computer screen, or physically attach a post-it
note, because that is where I expect to be looking
at the relevant time).
As well as anticipating the appropriate time and
place for a cue to appear when we ofﬂoad inten-
tions, it is also necessary to decide what aspects of
the intention need to be ofﬂoaded. It is useful
here to distinguish between prospective and retro-
spective elements of delayed intentions (Cohen,
West, & Craik, 2001). The prospective element
denotes the requirement to remember that some-
thing needs to be done at a particular time and
the ability to trigger that intention when necessary.
The retrospective element denotes the requirement
to remember the appropriate behaviour once the
prospective element has been triggered. In everyday
life, it is clearly possible to distinguish ofﬂoading of
the prospective versus the retrospective component
of an intention. For example, I might create a
content-free reminder (e.g., tying a knot in my
handkerchief), which reminds me that something
needs to be done, but not what it is (see Fish
et al., 2007, for further discussion of content-free
cueing). Alternatively, I might write the details of
an appointment on a piece of paper, which
reminds me of where I need to go, but only after
I have remembered that I need to go somewhere
and consulted this record. In the present inten-
tion-ofﬂoading task, a circle placed in a particular
location could arguably cue both the prospective
content of an intention (e.g., that I need to do
something special when I get to number 5 in the
sequence) as well as the retrospective content
(e.g., what I need to do is drag it to the left). An
alternative interpretation might be that the pro-
spective element simply represents that something
needs to be done on this trial, and the retrospective
content is that circle 5 needs to be dragged to the
left, in which case only the retrospective content
was ofﬂoaded. Either way, it is an interesting possi-
bility that intention ofﬂoading may depend on dis-
tinct mechanisms when supporting the prospective
content of an intention, the retrospective content,
or both. An additional consideration is that partici-
pants were explicitly provided with the intention
ofﬂoading strategy in the present studies.
However, the metacognitive mechanisms involved
in generating a novel strategy may well differ
from those investigated here, where participants
implement a known strategy. Finally, it is of
course possible that the metacognitive factors that
relate to intention ofﬂoading over a short timescale,
as in the present intention ofﬂoading task, may
differ from those responsible for intention ofﬂoad-
ing over longer periods of minutes, days, or weeks.
In the data presented in this article, it was not
possible to distinguish whether a failure to
respond correctly to a target was caused by partici-
pants failing to remember their intention, failing to
encode the intention to begin with, or incorrectly
encoding the target identity or required response.
These possibilities are difﬁcult to distinguish
behaviourally, but may be more amenable to a func-
tional neuroimaging approach (for an adaptation of
the present paradigm to an functional magnetic res-
onance imaging, fMRI, setting see Landsiedel and
Gilbert, 2014). On a neurophysiological level, per-
formance of unaided tasks requiring the fulﬁlment
of delayed intentions has been linked to signal
change in rostral prefrontal cortex (Burgess,
Quayle, & Frith, 2001; Gilbert, 2011; Okuda
et al., 1998), and patients with damage to this
region show disorganization in everyday life
(Burgess, 2000; Uretzky & Gilboa, 2010). This
suggests that a core process involved in executing
delayed intentions is supported by rostral prefrontal
cortex (PFC). However, this region has also been
implicated in generating metacognitive awareness
of our own mental states (Baird, Smallwood,
Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013; Fleming &
Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012;
Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010;
McCurdy et al., 2013). This points to a potential
additional way in which rostral PFCmight contrib-
ute to everyday behavioural organization: by proac-
tively triggering externalizing strategies (and indeed
other strategies) in situations where unaided abil-
ities are insufﬁcient, with the consequence that sub-
sequent demands on its role in fulﬁlling delayed
intentions will be reduced. Understanding the
ways in which such strategies are triggered, how
they vary across individuals—in health and
GILBERT
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disease and across the lifespan—and how they
inﬂuence subsequent behaviour can broaden our
understanding of behavioural organization in
everyday life.
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